Abstract. In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called P2.1 r , that is based on Goble's logic SDLaPe-a bimodal extension of Goble's logic P that invalidates aggregation for all prima facie obligations. The logic P2.1 r has several advantages with respect to SDLaPe. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation "as much as possible". It thus leads to a richer consequence set than SDLaPe. The logic P2.1 r avoids Goble's criticisms against other non-adjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the 'toy examples' from the literature as well as more complex ones.
Introduction
Over the last two decades a plethora of deontic logics have been proposed for which deontic explosion (to derive OB from OA and O¬A) is not valid. A large number of these systems are obtained by rejecting or restricting the aggregation principle-from OA and OB to derive O(A ∧ B).
1
Given the way in which humans build up their norms, it seems realistic to suppose that they adhere to norms deriving from conflicting normative systems. Non-adjunctive deontic logics are especially suited to handle such cases, since they do not allow to derive O(A ∧ ¬A) from OA and O¬A. This makes good sense: the observation that two normative systems are in conflict, should not lead to the conclusion that there is a normative system that forces one to do the impossible. Thus, the intuitive principle "Ought implies Can" can be preserved. In [6, p. 466] , Lou Goble stated that giving up aggregation is "perhaps the most natural suggestion for avoiding deontic explosion". In several papers Goble advocated the use of one particular such logic, namely the logic P [2], [3], [4] . P is a very well-behaved system and has a natural interpretation in a Kripkelike semantics.
2 It has moreover a nice axiomatization and avoids any kind of explosion when applied to conflicting obligations.
3 Still, the logic P has a serious drawback: it is too weak, especially when applied to obligations that are mutually compatible. For instance, in the famous Horty example [7, p. 37] , Smith is confronted with two obligations: (i) he ought to fight in the army or perform alternative service to his country ((O (F ∨ S) ) and (ii) he is not permitted to fight in the army, or what comes to the same, he ought not the fight in the army (O¬F ). As there is no conflict among these obligations, it seems reasonable to infer OS. Nevertheless, the logic P (as well as other non-adjunctive deontic logics) does not enable one to do so. In other words, simply invalidating aggregation results in a logic that is too weak.
In [2] , Goble extends his logic P to the bimodal logic SDLaPe. The language of the latter contains two sets of deontic operators: the operator O e , which is the one from P, and the new operator O a . (The duals P e and P a are defined in the usual way.) Goble's motivation for this additional ought-operator is that O e A expresses that, under some set of norms, A ought to be case, but cannot express that A holds under any standard. The O a -operator gives one exactly this. This results in a greater expressive power and also in different ways for formalizing conflicts (see Section 3). Another reading of the operators is that O e A stands for the prima facie obligation to do A and that O a A stands for the actual ("allthings-considered") obligation to do A. In line with what is common, we shall accept the idea that a prima facie obligation functions as an actual obligation, in case it is not conflicted by other obligations.
The logic SDLaPe behaves exactly like Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) for the O a -operator and like P for the O e -operator. This seems to give the logic some advantages over P. Given the proper formalization, one can make sure that for all consistent 'parts' of the premises, the same results are obtained as with SDL. For instance, in the Smith example, formalizing the premises as O a (F ∨ S) and O a ¬F ensures that O a S is derivable. This solution presupposes, however, that one knows in advance which premises can be safely formalized with the O a -operator. But that seems like putting the cart before the horse. In complex cases, it requires reasoning to localize the conflicts and this reasoning now seems to be outside the scope of logic. Moreover, formalizing the premises in the wrong way (because some conflicts were not detected), may still lead to explosion. One could, of course, play it safe and formalize all obligations with the O e -operator, but then the inferential power reduces to that of P and we are back to square one.
